The Don\u27t Ask, Don\u27t Tell Repeal Act: Breaching the Constitutional Ramparts by Titus, Herbert W.
William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 6
The Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act: Breaching
the Constitutional Ramparts
Herbert W. Titus
Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Herbert W. Titus, The Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act: Breaching the Constitutional Ramparts, 18 Wm.
& Mary J. Women & L. 115 (2011), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol18/iss1/6
THE DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL REPEAL ACT:
BREACHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RAMPARTS
HERBERT W. TITUS*
INTRODUCTION
I. DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL REPEAL AMENDED THE SMALL
BUSINESS ACT
II. THE DADT REPEAL ACT WAS PASSED IN VIOLATION OF
HOUSE RULES
III. THE DADT REPEAL ACT DIVESTED CONGRESS OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
IV. THE DADT REPEAL ACT UPENDED THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS
V. THE DADT REPEAL ACT THREATENS POWERS RESERVED
TO THE STATES
VI. THE DADT REPEAL ACT PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF THE
COURTS
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 2011, The New York Times reported that President
Barack Obama formally certified “that the American military is ready
for the repeal of the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy as Pentagon officials
said that nearly two million service members had been trained in
preparation for gay men and women serving openly in their ranks.”1
“Enactment of the repeal will come in 60 days,” the report continued,
“because . . . the late Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia . . .
[required] as his price for supporting the bill . . . that the measure re-
turn to Congress for a two-month review period.” 2 Whether Congress
“will review the law and whether any hearings will be held,” the Times
observed, “is unclear.” 3 Indeed, if the initial passage of the repeal
* A member of the Virginia Bar, Herbert W. Titus is Of Counsel to the Vienna,
Virginia law firm of William J. Olson, P.C. The firm’s website is http://www.lawand
freedom.com. Mr. Titus holds a Juris Doctor degree from Harvard Law School. He taught
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1. Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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legislation is any indication, the sixty-day period will transpire with-
out either meaningful congressional review or hearings, the review
period having been designed by Congress to provide constitutional
cover so that it could, like Pontius Pilate, wash its hands of any
responsibility for a change in military policy that dates back to the
founding days of the republic.
I. DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL REPEAL AMENDED THE SMALL
BUSINESS ACT
On December 15, 2010, in the closing days of the Second Session
of the 111th Congress, H.R. 2965 was amended in the House of
Representatives4 and given a brand new name: the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Repeal Act of 2010” (DADT Repeal Act).5 Prior to this amendment,
H.R. 2965 had been entitled the “Enhancing Small Business Research
and Innovation Act of 2009.” 6 Initially introduced in the House on
June 19, 2009,7 H.R. 2965 had been designed as an amendment to the
Small Business Act with respect to the Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR)
programs.8 This bill had been the subject of hearings before the House
Small Business Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, and
had been debated, amended, and passed by the House on July 8,
2009.9 As passed, H.R. 2965 would provide federal assistance to
small businesses “that will reach either an underperforming geo-
graphic area . . . or an underrepresented population group.”10
After passage in the House, however, the Senate struck the text
of H.R. 2965 and substituted the language of its own bill—S. 1233.11
This bill reauthorized the SBIR and STTR programs of the Small
Business Administration (SBA) through FY 2023.12 The Senate then
sent H.R. 2965, as amended, back to the House.13 There the bill sat
until December 15, 2010, when the House took up H.R. 2965 and
4. H.R. 2965 Bill Summary & Status, All Congressional Actions with Amendments,
THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02965:
@@@S (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter THOMAS (Library of Congress)].
5. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R. 6520, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010).
6. Enhancing Small Business Research and Innovation Act of 2009, H.R. 2965,
111th Cong. § 1 (2009).
7. THOMAS (Library of Congress), supra note 4.
8. H.R. 2965.
9. THOMAS (Library of Congress), supra note 4.
10. H.R. 2965 § 301.
11. THOMAS (Library of Congress), supra note 4.
12. SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 1233, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009).
13. THOMAS (Library of Congress), supra note 4.
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passed it, but with an entirely different subject and purpose.14 The
newly minted H.R. 2965 was amended to read as follows:
Resolved, That the House agree to the amendment of the
Senate to the bill (H.R. 2965) entitled “An Act to amend the Small
Business Act with respect to the Small Business Innovation
Research Program and the Small Business Technology Transfer
Program, and for other purposes.”, with the following
HOUSE AMENDMENT TO SENATE AMENDMENT:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the
amendment of the Senate, insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
Repeal Act of 2010”.15
Despite the title, the Act did not actually repeal DADT. Rather,
Congress left that to the bureaucrats, delegating to the Pentagon the
power to develop a “policy concerning homosexuality in the armed
forces,”16 in recognition that the Secretary of Defense was already
conducting a “Comprehensive Review on the Implementation of a
Repeal of 10 U.S.C. 654 [DADT].”17 Thus, the repeal act had “[n]o
[i]mmediate [e]ffect on [c]urrent [p]olicy.—Section 654 of title 10,
United States Code [DADT], . . . [but would] remain in effect until
such time that” the Secretary of Defense completed his comprehen-
sive review, and such completion was certified by the President to
the Armed Services Committees of both houses of Congress, such
certification having triggered a sixty-day period at the end of which
the repeal would take effect.18
Three days after House passage, on December 18, 2010, the
Senate passed amended H.R. 2965, and four days after that the
President signed the DADT Repeal Act into law.19 Seven months
later, on July 22, 2011, the President announced that, “[i]n accor-
dance with the legislation that [he had] signed into law in December,
[he had] certified and notified Congress that the requirements for
14. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R. 2965, 111th Cong. §§ 1–2 (2010).
15. Id. § 1 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. § 2.
17. Id. § 2(a)(1).
18. Id. § 2.
19. THOMAS (Library of Congress), supra note 4.
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repeal have been met. ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ will end, once and for
all, in 60 days—on September 20, 2011.” 20
II. THE DADT REPEAL ACT WAS PASSED IN VIOLATION OF
HOUSE RULES
Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution authorizes
“[e]ach House [of Congress to] determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings.” 21 Pursuant to that authority, the House of Representatives
adopted Rules of the House of Representatives. Rule XVI, Clause 7
of those rules states that “[n]o motion or proposition on a subject dif-
ferent from that under consideration shall be admitted under color
of amendment.” 22 Adopted in 1789, this Clause requires that any
amendment to a bill on the floor of the House be “germane,” that is, the
“amendment must relate to the subject matter under consideration.”23
According to the House manual, any proposed amendment “must not
only have the same end as the matter sought to be amended, but must
contemplate a method of achieving that end that is closely allied to the
method encompassed in the bill.” 24
It is self-evident that the subject of DADT—open homosexual be-
havior in the military—is not “germane” to small business technology
and innovation. The purpose of the DADT Repeal Act—permitting
open homosexual behavior—is clearly unrelated to H.R. 2965’s orig-
inal purpose of providing federal assistance to small business tech-
nology and innovation. The House Rules manual provides numerous
examples of amendments that demonstrate just how wide off the mark
the DADT repeal amendment was to the original small business sub-
ject matter of H.R. 2965. Two of those precedents are sufficient to dem-
onstrate that the DADT repeal did not meet the germane standard.
In 1962, it was stated that a bill to eliminate wage discrimination
based on sex could not be amended to ban wage discrimination on
the basis of race.25 In 1973, an amendment expressing the intent of
Congress that the President take steps to resume trade relations be-
tween Arab states and Israel was ruled not germane to a bill autho-
rizing military funds for Israel and support for a U.N. emergency
force in the area.26
20. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by
the President on Certification of Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (July 22, 2011)
(emphasis added), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/22/statement
-president-certification-repeal-dont-ask-dont-tell.
21. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5.
22. H.R. Doc. No. 107-284, at 689 (2003).
23. Id. at 689, 694.
24. Id. at 696.
25. See id. at 694.
26. Id.
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The DADT Repeal Act also fails the jurisdictional test in the
House rules—whether the proposed amendment is within the jurisdic-
tion of the House Committee reporting the bill.27 When H.R. 2965 was
introduced in 2009: (i) it was assigned to the House Small Business
and Science and Technology Committees;28 (ii) hearings were held
by the Science and Technology’s subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation;29 and (iii) the amended Bill was then reported to the House
by the Committee on Small Business.30 After passage of H.R. 2965
in the House, the Senate amended it by substituting its SBIR/STTR
Reauthorization Act, which had been reported out by the Committee
on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.31 Had the DADT Repeal
Act been introduced in either house of Congress as a stand-alone bill,
there is little doubt it would have been referred to each house’s respec-
tive Armed Services Committee and subjected to the normal legisla-
tive process of committee hearings.
The lame duck Democratic leadership of the 111th Congress
used its supermajority to bypass that Committee process,32 and in
blatant disregard of the House Rules. The American people are
constitutionally entitled that any bill enacted into law be handled in
accordance with the established rules of proceeding adopted by
Congress to govern itself.33
III. THE DADT REPEAL ACT DIVESTED CONGRESS OF ITS
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Prior to the DADT Repeal Act, Congress had consistently fol-
lowed its lawful procedures in shaping and enacting into law its
military policies governing homosexual behavior. The policies and
procedures for discharging active homosexuals had been established
27. See id. at 698.
28. THOMAS (Library of Congress), supra note 4.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 1223, 111th Cong., at 1 (2009).
32. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1041, 1495 (9th ed. 2004) (explaining that a super-
majority is a “fixed proportion greater than half (often two-thirds or a percentage greater
than 50%)” and a lame duck session is a “post-election legislative session in which some
of the participants are voting during their last days as elected officials”); Final Vote Results
for Roll Call 638, OFFICE OF THE CLERK: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 15,
2010), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll638.xml (demonstrating that 235 Democratic
Representatives voted for H.R. 2965, 15 voted against the measure and five Democratic
Senators did not vote); U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—2nd Session, U.S.
SENATE (Dec. 18, 2010) http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call
_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2&vote=00281 (demonstrating that 55 Democratic
Senators voted for H.R. 2965 and no Democratic Senators voted against H.R. 2965).
33. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating that each House of Congress has the authority
to make its own rules of proceeding).
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by Congress in the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice signed into law by President Truman in 1950.34 Then, DADT
was enacted on November 30, 1993 as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.35 DADT itself was a compro-
mise measure36 designed to continue the military policy dating back
to the nation’s founding that homosexuality is incompatible with
military service37 and that persons who engaged in homosexual acts
were subject to discharge.38
Codified as 10 U.S.C. § 654(a), DADT sets forth fifteen detailed
congressional findings.39 Foremost among these findings was this
statement of authority: “Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of
the United States commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to
raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.” 40 Thus, Congress found that “it lies within the discretion of
the Congress to establish qualifications for and conditions of service
in the armed forces.” 41 Next, Congress itemized nine additional find-
ings to support its ultimate conclusion that “[t]he prohibition against
homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that
continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military
service”42 and that “[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability.” 43
Based on these legislative findings, Congress directed the
Department of Defense (DoD) to separate a member of the armed
services from such service upon proof that said member “has en-
gaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in
a homosexual act or acts” unless certain mitigating factors are found
to be present.44 In short, the DADT Act directed the DoD to carry out
34. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, art. 125, 64 Stat. 107, 141
(1950); Uniform Code of Military Justice, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, 1, http://www.loc.gov/rr
/frd/Military_Law/pdf/UCMJ_summary.pdf.
35. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107
Stat. 1547, 1670 (1993) (including the DADT policy as codified as 10 U.S.C. § 654).
36. Thom Shanker & Patrick Healy, A New Push to Roll Back ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at A14.
37. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (2006) (repealed 2011).
38. Id. § 654(b)(1).
39. Id. § 654(a).
40. Id. § 654(a)(1) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 654(a)(3) (emphasis added).
42. Id. § 654(a)(13) (emphasis added).
43. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006) (repealed 2011) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 654(b).
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a congressional policy in a manner prescribed by Congress in the
exercise of the legislative powers vested in it by Article I, Section 8,
Clause 14 “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces.” 45
In contrast, by the DADT Repeal Act, Congress divested itself of
its constitutionally entrusted legislative powers. First, the so-called
DADT Repeal Act repealed nothing. Rather, Section 2(c) stated, as
follows: “No Immediate Effect on Current Policy.—Section 654 of title
10, United States Code, shall remain in effect.” 46 Instead, Congress
left the repeal decision to the Secretary of Defense. Thus, according to
subsection 2(c), the DADT policy would continue in effect until (i) the
Secretary of Defense has prepared his “[c]omprehensive [r]eview” on
the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell;47 (ii) the DoD has prepared the
“necessary policies and regulations” to effect the repeal “consistent
with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit
cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces”;48 and
(iii) the “President transmits to the congressional defense commit-
tees a written certification, signed by the President, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” stating
that the two previously listed requirements have been met and are
in effect.49
In short, by the enactment of the DADT Repeal Act, Congress
delegated the legislative power vested in it by Article I, Section 8,
Clause 14 of the Constitution to the unelected bureaucrats of the
DoD.50 Even the President has only a nominal role—that of certifying
to select congressional committees that the DoD exercised the dis-
cretionary powers delegated by the repeal act.51 Thus, the Act not
only delegates the specific legislative power expressly vested by the
Constitution in Congress, but it transfers the executive power vested
solely in the President by Article II, Section 1 to implement DoD poli-
cies and rules governing homosexual behavior in the military into
the bowels of the Pentagon.52 The President’s act of cosigning the cer-
tification required by subsection 2(b) of the Act contemplates nothing
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
46. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R. 6520, 111th Cong. § 2(c) (2010)
(repealing 10 U.S.C. § 654, commonly known as the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy).
47. Id. §§ 2(a)(1), 2(b)(1).
48. Id. § 2(b)(2)(C).
49. See id. § 2(b)(2).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; H.R. 6520 § 2(b).
51. H.R. 6520 § 2(b)(2).
52. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749–50 (1982) (explaining that Article II,
Section 1 entrusts the President with “supervisory and policy responsibilities of the utmost
discretion and sensitivity” which, in light of the DADT repeal act, has been handed over
to the DoD).
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more than a rubber stamp of the policies and procedures developed
solely by the DoD.53
Such presidential deference to his bureaucratic subordinates is
an even more egregious violation of the constitutional principle of the
separation of powers than President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s
steel mills during the Korean War.54 As Justice Black observed in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the President’s seizure order
was unconstitutional because it did “not direct that a congressional
policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress”;55 rather, “it
direct[ed] that a presidential policy be executed in a manner pre-
scribed by the President.” 56 However, section 2 of the DADT Repeal
Act directs that a DoD policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed
Forces be developed and implemented in a manner prescribed by the
Pentagon.57 At least with the steel seizure action, the buck stopped at
the White House with an elected president politically accountable to
the people. If the DADT repeal policy fails, Congress and the President
have positioned themselves to scapegoat the Pentagon.
IV. THE DADT REPEAL ACT UPENDED THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The statutory process by which Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is being
repealed, while a new policy is being put into place, is also unconsti-
tutional. According to section 2(f) of the DADT Repeal Act, DADT is
repealed sixty days after the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to the Senate
and House defense committees that the Secretary has completed his
report described in section 2(a)(2) and that the Defense Department
has prepared rules and regulations that are consistent with military
effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting/retention.58
Whatever policies and regulations are ultimately selected by
defense officials to replace DADT, they will not be the product of
a constitutionally prescribed process. Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution states that a bill becomes a law when it passes both
houses of Congress and is signed by the President or, if unsigned, is
not returned to the house of origin by the President within ten days.59
Under the DADT Repeal Act, the rules and regulations governing
homosexual behavior in the military will become law without having
53. See id.
54. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
55. Id. at 588.
56. Id.
57. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R. 6520, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010)
(repealing 10 U.S.C. § 654).
58. See id. § 2(f).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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to comply with either the bicameral or presentment principles, as
those principles are prescribed in the Constitution.60 As the Supreme
Court ruled in INS v. Chadha:61 “By providing that no law could
take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the
Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief . .
. that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully
and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.” 62
According to the DADT Repeal Act, it is the Secretary of Defense,
an unelected official, who will decide what policy will replace DADT.63
The repeal act acknowledges that the Secretary has (i) previously is-
sued a March 2, 2010 memorandum “directing the Comprehensive
Review on the Implementation of a Repeal of [DADT]”;64 and (ii) al-
ready established the “[o]bjectives and scope” of that review.65 By
this acknowledgment, Congress has confirmed that by enacting the
DADT Repeal Act, the legislative baton is already in the Secretary’s
hand. Under the repeal act, then, it is the Secretary who determines
the objective and scope of the review.66 It is the Secretary who deter-
mines what impact repeal will have on “military readiness, military
effectiveness and unit cohesion, recruiting/retention, and family
readiness” and what actions should be taken to meet whatever prob-
lems arise upon repeal.67 It is the Secretary who determines “leader-
ship, guidance, and training on standards of conduct.” 68 It is the
Secretary who determines “appropriate changes to existing policies
and regulations . . . regarding personnel management, leadership
and training, facilities, investigations, and benefits.” 69 Only after
such determinations are made does the President have any say in
the matter. Even then he is only required to affix his signature to a
letter certifying that “the implementation of necessary policies and
regulations . . . is consistent with the standards of military readiness,
military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention
of the Armed Forces.” 70
And what role does Congress play? No role whatsoever, not even
a legislative veto. All that the DADT Repeal Act requires of Congress
is that its “defense committees” passively receive a certificate signed
60. See H.R. 6520 § 2(c).
61. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
62. Id. at 948–49.
63. See H.R. 6520 § 2(a).
64. Id. § 2(a)(1).
65. Id. § 2(a)(2).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 2(a)(2)(A).
68. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B).
69. H.R. 6520 § 2(a)(2)(C).
70. Id. § 2(b)(2)(C).
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by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that the DoD has performed the tasks
set forth in section 2 of the act.71 To that end, on July 22, 2011, the
President transmitted to the chairman and ranking member of the
defense committees of each house of Congress a certification letter,
which reads as follows:
Pursuant to section 2(b)(2) of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal
Act of 2010 . . . (the “Act”), we hereby certify the following:
(1) That we have considered the recommendations con-
tained in the report required by the memorandum of the
Secretary of Defense referred to in section 2(a) of the
Act, namely, the Report of the Comprehensive Review of
the Issues Associated with a Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell,” and the Report’s proposed plan of action.
(2) That the Department of Defense has prepared the
necessary policies and regulations to exercise the dis-
cretion provided by the amendments made by section 2(f)
of the Act.
(3) That the implementation of the necessary policies
and regulations pursuant to the discretion provided by
the amendments made by section 2(f) of the Act is con-
sistent with the standards of military readiness, military
effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention
of the Armed Forces.72
In short, the DoD’s rules and regulations governing homosexual
activity in the military will become law without any further action
by Congress.73 Thus, the DoD’s rules and regulations become law by
the discretionary act of a single person—the Secretary of Defense.74
Even Alexander Hamilton, a most vocal supporter of a strong execu-
tive, warned against the establishment of a single law-making body,
calling it “one of the most execrable forms of government that human
infatuation ever contrived.” 75 Without the check and balance of a bi-
cameral legislative body, America’s Founders feared that, in light of
the fallibility of human nature, special interests would be favored over
71. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)–(C).
72. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 20
(emphasis added).
73. See H.R. 6520 § 2(c).
74. Id. §§ 2(a), 2(c).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 125 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
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public needs.76 Indeed, by dispensing with the normal legislative hear-
ing process open to the public, the DADT Repeal Act closed the door
to any serious congressional debate over the repeal of the DADT
Act—enacted just seventeen years previously—despite the fact that
Congress specifically found that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
vested Congress with the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” 77
V. THE DADT REPEAL ACT THREATENS POWERS RESERVED
TO THE STATES
Many might read Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 to grant the
federal government the power to require the National Guard to abide
by the post-DADT rules and regulations promulgated by the DoD,
just as those rules and regulations would apply to the United States
Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force and Coast Guard.78 Yet the National
Guard is not a United States armed force.79 Although, “[s]ince 1933
all persons who have enlisted in a State National Guard unit have
simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the United States,”
the Supreme Court observed in Perpich v. Department of Defense,
that “unless and until ordered to active duty in the Army, they re-
tained their status as members of a separate State Guard unit.” 80
Therefore, the National Guard is still composed of fifty separate
state militias.81
Congress does not have the same plenary power over these state
militias as it has over the nation’s military.82 Article I, Section 8,
Clauses 12 and 13 authorize Congress “[t]o raise and support Armies”
and “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” but there is no similar grant
of power to create the militias of the several states.83 Unlike the
United States Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard,
the militia is not a creature of the United States Congress.84 Rather,
76. See id.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed 2011).
78. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. (giving Congress the power to “make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”).
79. See 32 U.S.C.S. § 101(2) (1956).
80. 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990).
81. See 32 U.S.C.S. § 101(4)–(7) (1956).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–16 (listing Congress’s powers to “provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia”).
83. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.
84. See About the National Guard, NAT’L GUARD, http://www.ng.mil/About/default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (noting that “[t]oday’s National Guard still remains a dual
state-[f ]ederal force”).
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the militia preexisted the adoption and ratification of the United
States Constitution.85 That is why Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15
and 16 refer to “the militia” with the definite article “the.” 86 The
drafters had something very specific in mind, namely, all able-bodied
male citizens of the several states generally between eighteen and
forty-five years of age equipped with appropriate weaponry.87
Although Congress is authorized to “provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining”—that is, funding—the militia,88 it is not
vested with the power to constitute the militia in the first instance.89
Although Congress is authorized to govern the militia, such power
is limited to “such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States.” 90 Even then, Congress is limited in its authority
to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,” not as a standing
army for general use as an armed force.91 Finally, whereas Congress
may prescribe the rules of discipline of the militia, the training thereof
remains under the authority of the states by officers appointed by
the states.92
No doubt, Congress is also vested by Article 1, Section 8, Clause
18 “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper,” but this
power extends only “for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 93
Congress simply has no power to constitute the militia, and therefore,
no power to set the criteria of eligibility to serve in the militia.94 That
being so, the Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively.” 95
This line of argument is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s recent
opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, wherein the Court wrote:
Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the power to
create . . . the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in
85. See id. (explaining that the National Guard “traces its history back to the earli-
est English colonies in North America,” prior to the United States’ independence from
Great Britain).
86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008).
87. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 341 (1990).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (emphasis added).
89. See id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
92. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
93. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16.
95. See id. amend. X.
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existence. Congress is given the power to “provide for calling forth
the Militia” and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and
not to organize “a” militia, which is what one would expect if the
militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize “the” militia,
connoting a body already in existence. This is fully consistent with
the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied men. From
that pool, Congress has plenary power to organize the units that
will make up an effective fighting force. That is what Congress did
in the first militia Act, which specified that “each and every free
able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident
therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under
the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after [sic] excepted)
shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia.” 96
Therefore, the states have traditionally set enlistment standards for
their National Guard units, the most prominent of which is that one
must be a citizen of the state to enlist in that state’s National Guard.97
There is no good reason why the states may not also determine who,
among those citizens is “able-bodied,” that is, has a sound body, not
incapacitated for service in the military. It follows that, as a matter
of state law governing eligibility to serve in its National Guard unit,
a state may determine that an active, open, practicing homosexual
is ineligible to serve.98
This constitutional role of the states is precisely what Virginia
Delegate Bob Marshall (R-13th District) would have preserved if his
January 21, 2011 bill (House Bill 2474) had been enacted into law by
the Virginia General Assembly.99 The bill would have declared that
“[n]o person ineligible to serve in the Armed Forces of the United
States under 10 U.S.C. § 654 [DADT] . . . as in effect on January 1,
2009, shall be eligible to serve in the National Guard.”100 In support
of this eligibility rule, Delegate Marshall included pertinent legislative
findings, such as the long history of prohibitions against allowing
open homosexuals to serve in the military dating back to President
Washington.101 He also relied on expert testimony from committee
hearings demonstrating that overt homosexual behavior adversely
impacted “unit cohesion[,] . . . the condition which makes soldiers
96. 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (alterations in original) (third emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
97. See id.
98. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the States powers not delegated to the
federal government).
99. See H.D. 2474, 2011 Sess. (Va. 2011); Delegate Robert G. Marshall—Legislation
as Chief Patron, VIRGINIA LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe
?111+mbr+H57C (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
100. H.D. 2474.
101. Id. ¶ 19.
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‘willing to risk death to achieve a common objective.’ ”102 In other
words, active homosexual behavior in the military—like disqualifying
physical disabilities—undermines combat capability, because such
behavior undermines “the bonds of trust among individual service
members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit
greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual
unit members.”103
The central issue is not whether an individual who lives an openly
homosexual lifestyle would make a good soldier. Rather, the issue is
the impact of his behavior upon “unit cohesion” of the whole.104 Under
the DADT policy embraced by Virginia Delegate Marshall’s bill, there
is allowance for certain exceptions to the ban on homosexual behavior
in recognition that “under the particular circumstances of the case,
the [service] member’s continued presence in the armed forces is con-
sistent with the interests of the armed forces in proper discipline, good
order, and morale.”105 Whereas a lame duck Congress may wish to
grant to the Secretary of Defense discretion to embrace a finding to
the contrary, the Commonwealth of Virginia need not succumb to the
siren call of the homosexual lobby based upon contemporary psycho-
logical and sociological prejudices and predictions. Indeed, any federal
effort to replace the composition of a state militia would be unconsti-
tutional as only those “Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.”106
VI. THE DADT REPEAL ACT PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF THE COURTS
Tucked into the DADT Repeal Act is an acknowledgment that the
Defense Secretary’s Comprehensive Review on the Implementation
of a Repeal of DADT includes an “[e]valuat[ion] [of] the issues raised
in ongoing litigation involving 10 U.S.C. 654.”107 This euphemistic ref-
erence hid from view the vigorous attacks then being waged in federal
courts by lawyers representing individual homosexual service mem-
bers challenging the constitutionality of DADT.108 Arguing from the
102. Id. ¶ 14(A).
103. Id. ¶ 14.
104. See id. ¶ 14(A)–(B) (describing factors for success in combat as high morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion).
105. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(D) (2006) (repealed 2011).
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
107. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, H.R. 6520, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(G) (2010).
108. E.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt v. Dep’t. of Air Force,
527 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2008); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1127
(9th Cir. 1997).
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radical premise of Lawrence v. Texas—that the due process clause pro-
tects persons engaged in homosexual conduct in private109—opponents
of DADT have argued in numerous cases that DADT violated service
members’ due process rights because DADT prohibited them from
engaging in such conduct.110 In response, government officials have
attempted to defend DADT, claiming that it served important gov-
ernment interests in military readiness, individual discipline, and
unit cohesion, and that, therefore, DADT justified what would other-
wise be a deprivation of the service member’s liberty.111 Yet, just a
month before the DADT Repeal Act was passed, the Government—
including the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—was undermining its defense of DADT
in a case pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by stating that “[t]he [Obama] Administration does not sup-
port [DADT] as a matter of policy and strongly believes Congress
should repeal it.”112
With the enactment of the DADT Repeal, and the soon-to-be-
revealed rules and regulations governing homosexual behavior in the
military, it will be difficult for the Government to demonstrate that
consensual homosexual conduct has anything to do with military read-
iness or unit cohesion. Thus, there is no reason to believe that such
rules and regulations will not generate new constitutional attacks
upon the enforcement of new policies. Even before the September 20,
2011 date upon which the DADT Repeal became effective, there have
been demands from some pro-DADT repeal groups in the military
urging recruitment outreach for gays and lesbians in the same way
military recruiters target blacks, Latinos and women.113
Because the Supreme Court has recognized in Lawrence v. Texas
that homosexuals have a fundamental right to “an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain inti-
mate conduct,”114 as one district court judge has ruled, any military
rules governing their expressive activity, including sexual conduct,
will be perceived as an intrusion “upon [their] personal and private
lives” and will be subject to “heightened scrutiny” by the courts.115
Indeed, in Witt v. Department of the Air Force, a three-judge panel
109. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
110. E.g., Cook, 528 F.3d at 45, 47; Witt, 527 F.3d at 809; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1130.
111. Witt, 527 F.3d at 821; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1133.
112. See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56634 (9th Cir. Nov. 1,
2010) (order).
113. Rowan Scarborough, Recruiters Pressed to Reach Out to Gays Once Ban is Lifted,
WASH. TIMES, July 28, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/group
-wants-military-recruiters-to-target-gays-aft.
114. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
115. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 911 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (quoting Witt, 527 F.3d at 819) (internal quotations omitted).
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decided that enforcement of DADT infringed upon a service member’s
fundamental right to engage in private homosexual behavior, unless
the Government could affirmatively demonstrate (i) that the specific
application of DADT to an individual homosexual service member
significantly furthers the government’s interest and (ii) that there
is no less intrusive means to achieve substantially the government’s
interest.116 Applying this standard, U.S. District Judge Virginia A.
Phillips determined that the evidence offered by the Government in
defense of DADT was not sufficiently empirical to convince her that
DADT would significantly further the government interests in
military readiness or unit cohesion, much less that such limitations
on homosexual expression or conduct were necessary to further
those interests.117
Judicial scrutiny in cases involving “fundamental rights”—
whether termed intermediate, strict, or otherwise—is presumed to
be legitimate,118 and within the nature and scope of judicial power.
Such questions as to whether a government interest is “compelling” or
“important,” or whether there are less intrusive means to accomplish
a government objective, have become the ordinary fare of judicial
review.119 In earlier times, such questions were considered to be out-
side the exercise of judicial power. As Chief Justice Marshall put it
in McCulloch v. Maryland, questions of the “degree of [a particular
law’s] necessity is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial
cognizance.”120 After all, as the Chief Justice pointed out, questions
whether “[a] thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or
indispensably necessary,” were not judicial, but political because the
concept of necessity is always up for interpretation.121 Article I,
Section 8, Clause 14 states that it is for Congress “[t]o make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”122
Interjecting different degrees of judicial scrutiny to ascertain whether
a particular rule, such as DADT, is unconstitutional departs from
the inherent limits on judicial review confining the courts to discov-
ering and applying permanent principles set forth in the constitu-
tional text.123
116. Witt, 527 F.3d at 819, 821.
117. Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp.2d at 922.
118. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978).
119. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (comparing the judicial
scrutiny applied to racial classifications to the scrutiny and government interests involved
in child custody determinations); Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. at 299 (discussing gen-
erally judicial scrutiny of government interests in racial classification cases).
120. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819).
121. Id. at 414.
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
123. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Although judicial discretion and law-making is in vogue, even
among conservatives, this more limited judicial role in the review of
the constitutionality of statutes in cases coming before the courts is
dictated by the very nature of constitutional law, indeed of law itself.
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall discussed the essential differ-
ence between matters of obligation and matters of discretion in order
to determine whether Marbury’s appointment was governed by law
or by politics.124 Only if delivery of Marbury’s commission as a jus-
tice of peace was a ministerial act—one of obligation—did the ap-
pointee have a vested legal right.125 Otherwise, it was a discretionary
matter for which President Jefferson was politically, but not legally,
accountable.126 As the Chief Justice explained in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States:
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws,
has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and
can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is
a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the
duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.127
Thus, in the exercise of judicial review, it is not the judge who de-
termines the law of the Constitution, it is the law of the Constitution
that binds the judge. To be sure, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in
Marbury that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the ju-
dicial department to say what the law is,”128 but he never said—
despite what most today claim he meant—that the law is whatever
the judicial department says it is. To the contrary, the Chief Justice
was no judicial supremacist. Rather, he justified judicial review on the
ground that the law of a written Constitution bound the courts, just as
it bound Congress and the President.129 Indeed, the very purpose of
putting the Constitution into writing was to define and limit not only
the powers of the legislative and executive branches, but of the judicial
branch as well.130 Otherwise, why would members of the judiciary, like
members of the legislative and executive departments, swear or af-
firm an oath to support the Constitution “if that constitution forms no
rule for [their] government”?131 The Constitution is not, therefore, an
124. Id. at 159–62.
125. See id. at 158, 162.
126. See id. at 165–66.
127. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
128. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
129. Id. at 180.
130. See id. at 176–77.
131. Id. at 180.
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instrument to be used by judges to reach their desired result, but an
instrument that binds the entire government—including the judges.132
Utilizing tests like “compelling state interest,” “least restrictive
alternative,” “substantial government interest,” and “undue burden,”
modern courts have ushered in a reign of judicial supremacy above the
written constitution, a result neither contemplated, nor sanctioned,
by Marbury.133 Today’s judges use such flexible standards and aca-
demic literature to reach their own social, economic, and political
goals.134 Thus, there is every reason to believe that many judges will
substitute their views for those of the military in the formulation
and implementation of the rules that will govern homosexuals and
their sexual activity in the Armed Forces.135 Such evolutionary ju-
dicial standards are well-suited to include discoveries of rights and
liberties that are totally foreign to the original meaning of words
and phrases such as “equal protection” and “due process of law.”
Such judicial balancing, however, does not always lead to deci-
sions favorable to individual liberty. Adjustable standards cut both
ways. While strict scrutiny may secure the right of homosexual men
and women to serve more openly in the military, will such close scru-
tiny secure the right of military chaplains who hold strict Biblical
beliefs about homosexuality?136 While strict scrutiny will secure the
right of homosexuals to publicly display their sexual orientation, will
such close judicial review guarantee that service members are free to
voice opinions critical of such conduct?137 After all, even the judicial
test of “rigid scrutiny” was flexible enough to justify a judicial ruling
that refused to protect American citizens of Japanese origin on the
west coast from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Executive
Order sending them to “relocation centers.”138
132. Id.
133. Cf. Larry Catá Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the
Dominion of Judges, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 119 & nn.9–10 (2003) (explaining
that the “legitimacy of a judicially self-conferred supremacy ‘in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution’ ” has been hotly debated throughout the United States’ history).
134. See id. at 123.
135. See id. at 120.
136. See Lauren Green, Military Chaplains Mull End of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,
FOXNEWS.COM (July 29, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/07/29/military-chaplains
-mull-end-don’t-ask-don’t-tell/.
137. See CHARLES A. DONOVAN, A CLASH OF INTEGRITIES: MORAL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
IN THE ARMED FORCES 2 (2011) (arguing that the implementation of the DADT Repeal Act
may compromise conservative service members’ free speech and religious liberty rights to
the detriment of their military careers); Daniel Carl, Staff Sergeant May Lose Career Over
‘Gay’ Indoctrination, WORLDNETDAILY (July 26, 2011, 8:11 PM), http://www.wnd.com
/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=326477 (noting that an Air Force staff sergeant may
be medically discharged for failing to support the military’s new policies accepting openly
gay service members).
138. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 217–18, 219, 220–21 (1944).
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CONCLUSION
At stake in the repeal of DADT is not just whether a seismic
change in military policy is sustainable without damage to military
readiness and unit cohesion. Additionally, the lawless process by
which the repeal is being accomplished shakes the American con-
stitutional republic at its very foundations. The central purpose of
separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism in the
nation’s constitution is to prevent the kind of headlong plunge taken
by Congress and the President to repeal DADT in response to emo-
tionally charged cries for equality. By the failure of both the legisla-
tive and executive branches to abide by the written covenant with
the American people to exercise only those powers enumerated in the
Constitution, and to exercise those powers only in accordance with
the processes specified therein, the leaders of both major political
parties have demonstrated that with the repeal of DADT they have
violated their oaths of office to support the Constitution of the
United States.
